Table 3.21. Local Government Current Receipts and Expenditures
[Billions of dollars]
Last Revised on: October 06, 2011
National Income and Product Accounts Tables
Friday, April 6, 2012
National Income and Product Accounts Tables
Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product
[Billions of dollars] Seasonally adjusted at annual rates
Last Revised on: March 29, 2012 - Next Release Date April 27, 2012
National Income and Product Accounts Tables
NI - Underlying Detail
Table 3.4U. Personal Current Tax Receipts
[Millions of dollars; quarters seasonally adjusted at annual rates]
Last Revised on: March 30, 2012 - Next Release Date April 30, 2012
NI - Underlying Detail
Sunday, December 4, 2011
"It's science..."
Just to be clear, I would be the first to argue that I am in no way a philosophical expert. The limited knowledge (predominately in the philosophy of science) that I possess is a function of targeted methodological inquiry as an ancillary skill set, and simple amateur interest. With that necessary caveat, I must say that I was surprised (unpleasantly) by the message of Nicholas Maxwell in a recent Guardian article. Maxwell basically casts the scientific community as rather disingenuous in their marketing. Specifically, he believes that promoting a message of the pursuit of truth is a deliberately misleading claim that is supported only through partial explanation of the true goals of scientists:
"The aim of seeking explanatory truth is a special case of the more general aim of seeking truth that is, in some way or other, important or of value. Values, of one kind or another, are inherent in the aims of science."
This may not be all that objectionable in isolation, as it is merely a reflection of the necessary persistence of ideology (as expounded upon by Schumpeter, described in an earlier post) and the difficulty in establishing a fully specified intersubjective rationality (discussed by, among others, Jurgen Habermas in The Theory of Communicative Action). What really irks both Jon Butterworth and myself, is the suggestion that scientists actively develop "gobbledegook" for the purpose of concealing the values that are actually inherent in ANY inquiry by ANYONE. Butterworth (likely all the more incensed because Maxwell specifically targets physics) argues appropriately that Maxwell incorrectly identifies a specific application of the macro-level goal of science (to explain) as a value judgment about the structure of acceptable inquiry. (He also explains that jargon is "is a short-hand to improve communication between experts which quickly becomes an obstacle if used outside a sub-field".) I would submit that Butterworth does not go far enough (though he does solidly deride Maxwell for supporting what amounts to post hoc rationalization of data via intentional explanatory stratification).
As a quick sidenote: The objective to explain is not meant to just "acquire information nor to utter all noncontradictory notions; its goal is a consensus of rational opinion over the widest possible field." I have borrowed here from Ziman to argue that the pursuit of a unified theory is consistent with expanding the scope of intersubjective rationality.
It seems to me that Maxwell misses some basic elements of epistemological practice. For starters, he conflates normative ends and practical means. To be sure, ends and means can never be truly separated so long as the same researcher defines both and ambiguity remains at the boundary between the two concepts. However, in some cases, it is useful to draw a distinction, particularly when making claims about the aspirational goals of scientific research. While scientists may very well be malicious in designing and implementing a particular research agenda, this in no way follows from the simple existence of value-laden theory development. The reason is that values are a fundamental input into the selection of hypotheses, whether or not the researcher is characterized by a high degree of empirical integrity. The Maxwell argument basically uses a characteristic of every state of the world as a causal element in the explanation of a subset of states of the world. Covariation is a prerequisite for isolation of the consequences of various phenomena in a given system.
I would further argue that Maxwell's complaint does not have a clear remedy. He suggests that the values of researchers be explained more thoroughly to permit critical examination by the lay population. I actually don't have any issues with this desire, nor any that facilitates greater flows of information. I think there are practical problems with conveying a sufficient amount of information to allow people to understand what exactly is problematic, but I will always support the concept and the development of more sophisticated practice. What I do have a problem with, however, is the insinuation (and perhaps I am taking his argument further than intended) that values can actually be removed from scientific inquiry. Maxwell argues that "values" are more "problematic" than untestable assumptions. First off, I would love to hear how he distinguishes between the two concepts. (e.g. - how is the idea of welfare systemically separated conceptually from a belief in Keynes' limited independent variety in the context of value definition?) Secondly, and more importantly, it is difficult to believe that values should be divorced from scientific inquiry. For one thing, values provide mechanistic benefits with respect to specification and identification. Moreover, values make scientific research relevant. In The Pursuit of Truth, Quine creates a basic epistemic structure comprised of stimulative (or observation) and analytical (or theory) sentences. The former describes what we observe, while the latter attempts to give the former meaning. The important takeaway is that they share the same words. Not just the same type of words, but rather literally the same words from a given statement. Their distinction is driven by the intent of the researcher. To borrow the words of Quine:
"It is precisely this sharing of words, by observation sentences and theoretical sentences, that provides logical connections between the two kinds of sentences and makes observation relevant to scientific theory."
Attacking the existence of values in scientific inquiry comes across as either a pursuit insufficiently considered, or straight up opportunistic posturing. Either way, the social benefits of the strategy are difficult to identify.
Just to be clear, I would be the first to argue that I am in no way a philosophical expert. The limited knowledge (predominately in the philosophy of science) that I possess is a function of targeted methodological inquiry as an ancillary skill set, and simple amateur interest. With that necessary caveat, I must say that I was surprised (unpleasantly) by the message of Nicholas Maxwell in a recent Guardian article. Maxwell basically casts the scientific community as rather disingenuous in their marketing. Specifically, he believes that promoting a message of the pursuit of truth is a deliberately misleading claim that is supported only through partial explanation of the true goals of scientists:
"The aim of seeking explanatory truth is a special case of the more general aim of seeking truth that is, in some way or other, important or of value. Values, of one kind or another, are inherent in the aims of science."
This may not be all that objectionable in isolation, as it is merely a reflection of the necessary persistence of ideology (as expounded upon by Schumpeter, described in an earlier post) and the difficulty in establishing a fully specified intersubjective rationality (discussed by, among others, Jurgen Habermas in The Theory of Communicative Action). What really irks both Jon Butterworth and myself, is the suggestion that scientists actively develop "gobbledegook" for the purpose of concealing the values that are actually inherent in ANY inquiry by ANYONE. Butterworth (likely all the more incensed because Maxwell specifically targets physics) argues appropriately that Maxwell incorrectly identifies a specific application of the macro-level goal of science (to explain) as a value judgment about the structure of acceptable inquiry. (He also explains that jargon is "is a short-hand to improve communication between experts which quickly becomes an obstacle if used outside a sub-field".) I would submit that Butterworth does not go far enough (though he does solidly deride Maxwell for supporting what amounts to post hoc rationalization of data via intentional explanatory stratification).
As a quick sidenote: The objective to explain is not meant to just "acquire information nor to utter all noncontradictory notions; its goal is a consensus of rational opinion over the widest possible field." I have borrowed here from Ziman to argue that the pursuit of a unified theory is consistent with expanding the scope of intersubjective rationality.
It seems to me that Maxwell misses some basic elements of epistemological practice. For starters, he conflates normative ends and practical means. To be sure, ends and means can never be truly separated so long as the same researcher defines both and ambiguity remains at the boundary between the two concepts. However, in some cases, it is useful to draw a distinction, particularly when making claims about the aspirational goals of scientific research. While scientists may very well be malicious in designing and implementing a particular research agenda, this in no way follows from the simple existence of value-laden theory development. The reason is that values are a fundamental input into the selection of hypotheses, whether or not the researcher is characterized by a high degree of empirical integrity. The Maxwell argument basically uses a characteristic of every state of the world as a causal element in the explanation of a subset of states of the world. Covariation is a prerequisite for isolation of the consequences of various phenomena in a given system.
I would further argue that Maxwell's complaint does not have a clear remedy. He suggests that the values of researchers be explained more thoroughly to permit critical examination by the lay population. I actually don't have any issues with this desire, nor any that facilitates greater flows of information. I think there are practical problems with conveying a sufficient amount of information to allow people to understand what exactly is problematic, but I will always support the concept and the development of more sophisticated practice. What I do have a problem with, however, is the insinuation (and perhaps I am taking his argument further than intended) that values can actually be removed from scientific inquiry. Maxwell argues that "values" are more "problematic" than untestable assumptions. First off, I would love to hear how he distinguishes between the two concepts. (e.g. - how is the idea of welfare systemically separated conceptually from a belief in Keynes' limited independent variety in the context of value definition?) Secondly, and more importantly, it is difficult to believe that values should be divorced from scientific inquiry. For one thing, values provide mechanistic benefits with respect to specification and identification. Moreover, values make scientific research relevant. In The Pursuit of Truth, Quine creates a basic epistemic structure comprised of stimulative (or observation) and analytical (or theory) sentences. The former describes what we observe, while the latter attempts to give the former meaning. The important takeaway is that they share the same words. Not just the same type of words, but rather literally the same words from a given statement. Their distinction is driven by the intent of the researcher. To borrow the words of Quine:
"It is precisely this sharing of words, by observation sentences and theoretical sentences, that provides logical connections between the two kinds of sentences and makes observation relevant to scientific theory."
Attacking the existence of values in scientific inquiry comes across as either a pursuit insufficiently considered, or straight up opportunistic posturing. Either way, the social benefits of the strategy are difficult to identify.
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